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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES FLETCHER ANDERSON and 
JODE W. ANDERSON, 
Defendants. 
Case NO.870066-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Fifth 
Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, Salt Lake 
Department, finding Appellants guilty of violation of Salt Lake 
City Ordinances 19-3-8 and 19-3-9 prohibiting the presence of an 
individual under the age of 21 in an establishment licensed to 
distribute draft beer. This appeal is taken as of right under 
Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented for review in this 
appeal: 
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a) Whether or not Salt Lake City Ordinances 19-3-8 and 
19-3-9 deny equal protection in their application to the 
Defendants herein in violation of the due process clause of the 
Constitution of the United States and of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah; and 
b) Whether Salt Lake City Ordinances 19-3-8 and 19-3-
9 must be judicially construed to allow for the employment of a 
person over the age of 18, but under the age of 21, in a capacity 
that does not involve the handling or dispensing of alcohol so as 
to be consistent with the State law and to provide equal 
protection under the laws. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
United States Constitution 
Amendment XIV Section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof/ are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
2 
Amendment XXI Section 2 
The t r a n s p o r t a t i o n or impor ta t ion i n t o any S t a t e , 
Ter r i to ry , or possession of the United States for delivery or use 
t h e r e i n of i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r s , in v i o l a t i o n of t h e laws 
thereof, i s hereby prohib i ted . 
Const i tut ion of Utah 
Ar t ic le I f Section 24 [Uniform operation 
Al l laws of a g e n e r a l n a t u r e s h a l l 
operat ion. 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
Section 32A-1-4. Policy. 
The policies of the State are: 
1) The administration of this title shall be nonpartisan 
and free of partisan political influence. 
2) Alcoholic beverage control shall be operated as a public 
business using sound management principles and practices. The 
business shall be governed by a commission and operated by a 
department. The business shall function with the intent of 
servicing the public demand for alcoholic beverages. 
3) The commission and Department of Alcoholic Beverage 
Control shall neither promote nor encourage the sale or 




conduct, license, and regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages in 
a manner and at prices which reasonably satisfy the public demand 
and protect the public interest, including the rights of citizens 
who do not wish to be involved with alcoholic products. 
Section 32A-1-5. Definitions. 
As used in this title: 
1) "Alcoholic beverages" means "beer" and "liquor" as the 
terms are defined in this section. 
. . . . 
4) "Beer", "light beer", "malt liquor", or "malted 
beverages" means all products which contain 63/100 of 1% of 
alcohol by volume or 1/2 of 1% of alcohol by weight, but not more 
than 4% of alcohol by volume or 3.2% by weight, and are obtained 
by fermentation, infusion, or decoction of any malted grain. 
Beer may or may not contain hops or other vegetable products. 
. • • . 
7) "Club" and "private club" means any non-profit 
corporation operating as a social club, recreational, fraternal, 
or athletic association, or kindred association organized 
primarily for the benefit of its stock holders or members. 
. . . . 
17) "Liquor" means alcohol, or alcoholic, spiritous, 
vinous, fermented, malt, or other liquid, or combination of 
liquids, a part of which is spiritous, vinous, or fermented, and 
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all other drinks, or drinkable liquids which contain more than 
1/2 of 1% of alcohol by volume and is suitable to use for 
beverage purposes. The term "liquor" shall not include any 
beverage defined as a beer, malt liquor, or malted beverage, that 
has an alcohol content of less than 4% alcohol by volume. 
. . . . 
21) "Minor" means any person under the age of 21 years. 
• * • • 
24) "Package agency" means a retail liquor location 
operated under a contractual agreement with the department, by a 
person other than the state, who is authorized by the commission 
to sale package liquor for consumption off the premises of the 
agency. 
• • . • 
29) "Premises" means any building, enclosure, room, or 
equipment used in connection with the sale, storage, service, 
manufacture, distribution, or consumption of alcoholic products, 
unless otherwise defined in this title or in the rules adopted by 
the commission. 
• • . . 
38) "Sell", "sale" and "to sale" means any transaction, 
exchange, or barter whereby, for any consideration, an alcoholic 
beverage is either directly or indirectly transferred, solicited, 
ordered, delivered for value, or by any means or under any 
pretext is promised or obtained; whether done by a person as a 
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principal, proprietor, or as an agent, servant, or employee, 
unless otherwise defined in this title or the rules adopted by 
the commission. 
• • • • 
47) "Wine" means any alcoholic beverage obtained by the 
fermentation of the natural sugar contents of fruits, plants, 
honey, or milk, or any other like substance, whether or not other 
ingredients are added. The term "liquor" includes wine as 
defined herein. 
Section 32A-4-2C5) 
No minor shall be granted a restaurant liquor license or be 
employed by a restaurant to handle liquor. 
Section 32A-4-6Q4) 
No minor shall be employed by a restaurant licensee to sell 
or dispense alcoholic beverages. 
Section 32A-5-7(24)(e) 
No minor shall be employed by any club to sell or dispense 
or handle any alcoholic beverage. 
Section 32A-7-6(2)(k) 
No minor shall sell, serve, dispense, or anyway handle any 
alcoholic beverage at the "single" event. 
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Section 32A-10-7 
Cities and towns within their corporate limits, and counties 
outside of incorporated cities and towns have the power to 
license, tax, regulate, or prohibit the sale of light beer, at 
retail, in bottles, or draft. Licenses shall not be granted to 
sell beer in the proximity of any church or school, the local 
authority granting a license has the authority to determine in 
each case what constitutes proximity. 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah 
Section 19-3-8 
Presence of minors in a class mCm and class "D" premises 
prohibited. It shall be unlawful and shall constitute an 
offense of strict liability for any person under the age of 21 
years to: 
a) Enter or be in or about any premises licensed as a class 
nC" or "D" establishment, for the sale of beer, or 
b) To drink beer or any other alcoholic beverages in said 
licensed premises. 
c) Any person violating any provision of this section shall 
be deemed guilty of any infraction and may not be imprisoned, 
but shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $299.00. 
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Section 19-3-9 
It shall be unlawful and shall constitute an offense of 
strict liability for any licensee of a class nC" or class nD" 
license for the sale of beer or any operator, agentf or employee 
of such licensee to permit any person under the age of 21 years 
to remain in or about such licensed premises. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter is an appeal from the judgment of the Fifth 
Circuit Court finding Appellants guilty of violation of Salt Lake 
City Ordinances 19-3-8 and 19-3-9 prohibiting the presence of an 
individual under the age of 21 in an establishment licensed to 
distribute draft beer. Findings of Fact and Judgment were filed 
with the Court on February 24, 1987. The parties previously 
stipulated to the following facts: James Fletcher Anderson is 
the owner and operator of a tavern located within the confines of 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah. Jode W. Anderson, the wife of James 
Fletcher Anderson, was employed in the tavern performing 
functions which did not include the necessity of handling or 
dispensing alcoholic beverages, but which caused her to be upon 
the premises. Jode Anderson is a person under the age of 21, 
but over the age of 18. 
After hearing held December 7, 1986 the Honorable Judge 
Palmer of the Fifth Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, Salt 
Lake Department entered the Finding of Facts based upon the 
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stipulation reached between the parties and entered the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
1) Salt Lake City Ordinances 19-3-8 and 19-3-9 make no 
exclusion from their prohibition for a person under the age of 21 
being in an establishment licensed to dispense draft beer. This 
is a status offense violated by the presence of the individual on 
the premises. 
2) The above cited Ordinances are not unconstitutional 
denying equal protection and due process to the Defendants 
involved herein. 
3) The Court need not judicially construe the Ordinances to 
provide an interpretation consistent with the state law on the 
subject in order to constitutionally save the Ordinances. 
Subsequent to the Court entering its Finding of Facts 
and Conclusion of Law, the Defendants were found guilty as 
chargedf and sentenced to a term of six months in the County Jail 
and a fine of $100.00, said term to be suspended, and Defendants 
placed upon probation for a period of six months. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Twenty-first Amendment of the United States 
Constitution expressly grants the individual states the power to 
regulate the distribution of alcoholic substances. While such 
grant of power is express, it nevertheless remains subject to the 
parameters of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
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guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The Utah 
Constitution likewise provides for equal and uniform application 
of the laws of the state. While the Utah Code does not prohibit 
minors from working in establishments such as private clubs or 
restaurants where alcohol, wine and beer are served. Salt Lake 
City Ordinances as interpreted in this matter specifically 
prohibit the employment of minors in any capacity in taverns and 
other establishments which strictly serve beer as opposed to 
other alcoholic substances. In examining this distinction under 
equal protection standards, the disparity between the treatment 
of beer taverns, restaurants and private clubs in employing 
persons of legal age but less than 21 years of age does not bear 
a reasonable relationship to the enumerated interests of the 
state in regulating the distribution and sale of alcoholic 
substances. This analysis proves true both under Federal Equal 
Protection and Utah State Equal Protection analysis. In the 
alternative, Appellants argue that if the disparity between the 
two sections does not render Salt Lake City Ordinances 19-3-8 and 
19-3-9 unconstitutional, then this Court should construe the 
applicable Salt Lake City Ordinances as limited in scope and 
applicable only to patrons of the establishment and the handling, 
selling or dispensing of alcoholic beverages by employees. Such 
construction would be consistent with the long recognized 
importance of the right to work and the concomitant opportunity 
10 
to achieve economic security and stability as an essential 




SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 19-3-8 AND 19-3-9 VIOLATE 
APPELLANTS' EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES 
The United States Constitution specifically reserves 
to the individual states the power to regulate the consumption 
and distribution of alcoholic beverages. The Constitution of 
the United States, Amendment XXI, Section 2 (ratified 1933) . 
The broad sweep of the Amendment has been recognized as 
concerning something more than the normal state authority over 
public health, welfare and morals. Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor 
Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 330 12 L.Ed.2d 350, 84 S.Ct. 1293 (1964). 
Yet the Supreme Court has specifically held that the operation of 
the Twenty-first Amendment does not alter the application of 
equal protection standards that otherwise govern. Craig v. 
Boxen, 429 U.S. 190, 50 L.Ed.2d 397, 97 S.Ct. 451 (1976), 
rehearing denied 429 U.S. 1124, 51 L.Ed.2d 574, 97 S.Ct. 1161. 
"Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the 
Commerce Clause are parts of the same Constitution. 
Like other provisions of the Constitution, each must 
be considered in the light of the other, and in the 
context of the issues and interests at stake in any 
concrete case. Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 
377 U.S. at 332, 12 L.Ed.2d 350. 
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Pursuant to the power conferred upon the s t a t e of Utah 
under the Twenty-first Amendment Utah has enacted the Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Act. T i t l e 32A, Utah Code Annotated (1985) 
r e p l a c i n g former T i t l e 32 I n t o x i c a t i n g Liquors Code. Under 
T i t l e 32A persons under the age of 21 are r e s t r i c t e d from se l l i ng 
or dispensing alcohol ic beverages. Sections 32A-4-6(14), 32A-5-
7(24) (e) , 32A-7-2(5), and 32A-7-6 (2) (k) Utah Code Ann. None of 
these sec t ions f however, preclude the employment of persons under 
t h e age of 21 from p e r f o r m i n g t a s k s w i t h i n t h e r e s p e c t i v e 
establishments tha t do not involve the se l l i ng or dispensing of 
a l c o h o l i c b e v e r a g e s . The on ly a b s o l u t e p r o h i b i t i o n on 
employment i s with r e s p e c t to employment of minors in s t a t e 
l iquor s tores and departmental warehouses. Section 32-1-11(5) 
Utah Code Ann. 
Thus, persons under the age of 21 may be employed in 
res tauran t s where l iquor i s served, pr ivate clubs where drinks 
can be mixed and served, and at special one time events where 
l i q u o r i s s e r v e d , so long as t h e y a r e no t i n v o l v e d in t h e 
handling or dispensing of the a lcohol . 
Sec t ion 32A-10-7, Utah Code Ann. g r a n t s c i t i e s and 
towns within the corporate l i m i t s , and counties outside of the 
i n c o r p o r a t e d c i t i e s and t o w n s , t h e power t o l i c e n s e , t a x , 
regu la te , or prohib i t the sale of l i gh t beer. For purposes of 
T i t l e 32A, b e e r and l i g h t bee r a r e c o n s i d e r e d synonymous. 
Section 32A-1-5U), Utah Code Ann. Pursuant to t h i s delegation 
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of authority, Salt Lake City has established a blanket 
prohibition against "minors in taverns" irrespective of any 
involvement with the dispensing or selling of alcoholic 
beverages. Salt Lake City Municipal Ordinances 19-3-8 and 19-3-
9. The net effect of this Ordinance is to restrict persons under 
the age of 21 and over the majority age of 18 from being 
employed in retail beer outlets, but allowing them to be employed 
in private clubs, restaurants and special events where harder 
alcohols as well as beer and wine are served. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not deny the states the power to treat 
different classes of persons in different ways. Reed v. Reed, 
404 U.S. 71, 75-76, 30 L.Ed.2d 225, 229, 92 S.Ct. 251 (1971). 
The equal protection clause of that Amendment does, however, deny 
the states the power to legislate that different treatment be 
accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on 
the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that 
statute. A classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and 
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and 
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that 
all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. Id., 
cited in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447, 31 L.Ed.2d 349, 
359, 92 S.Ct. 1029 (1972) . 
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"If some persons or transactions excluded from 
the operation of a law, were as to the subject matter 
of the law in no differentiable class from those 
included within its operation, the law is 
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary and 
unconstitutional, Leethum v. McGinn, 524 P.2d 323, 
325 (Utah 1974) . 
In the immediate case, persons between the age of 18 
and 21 may be employed in restaurants wibh liquor licenses, 
private clubs and special one events where alcoholic substances 
are distributed, as long as they are not involved in such sale or 
distribution. Yet, these same persons cannot be employed by 
retail beer outlets in Salt Lake City despite being similarly 
circumstanced. All of these establishments distribute beer for 
sale. All of these establishments also require that food be sold 
on the premises in addition to the alcoholic substances. Private 
clubs and retail beer outlets are the most closely related 
enterprises. The main difference being that private clubs are 
allowed to not only sell beer, but wine and harder alcohols. 
Persons under the age of 21 can be employed in and around hard 
liquor dispensing outlets but when a softer alcohol substance 
such as beer is the only alcohol served, minors are barred. Thus 
the major distinction between these two enterprises runs counter 
to the established policy of restriction of persons under the age 
of 21 from being exposed to the sale, distribution and use of 
alcoholic substances. The classification in question herein, 
therefore, does not rest upon some ground of difference having a 
fair and substantial relation to the objects of the legislation. 
14 
Not only are persons similarly circumstances treated differently, 
distinctions drawn are actually counter to the declared policies 
of the state under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act and are 
thus rendered arbitrary and unconstitutional. 
POINT II 
SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCES 19-3-8 AND 19-3-9 LIKEWISE 
VIOLATE THE APPELLANTS' "EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS" UNDER 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution does not 
track the equal protection language of the U.S. Constitution, but 
this Section has been held to incorporate the same general 
fundamental principles incorporated in the federal Equal 
Protection Clause. Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 671 (Utah 
1984). Under Utah Equal Protection Analysis, whether a statute 
meets the requisite standards depends in the first instance upon 
the objectives of the statute and whether the classifications 
established provide a reasonable basis for promoting those 
objectives. Id. A valid classification, for statutory and 
constitutional purposes, must include all persons similarly 
situated, and must bear a reasonable relation to the purposes to 
be accomplished by the act. Where some persons or transactions 
excluded from the operation of the law are, as to its subject 
matter, in no differentiable class from those included in its 
operation, the law is discriminatory in the sense of being 
arbitrary and unconstitutional. Continental Bank and Trust v. 
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Farminqton City, 599 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Utah 1979) citing Davis v^ 
Qqden City, 117 Utah 315, 215 P.2d 616 (1950), Slater v^ Salt 
Lake City, 115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153 (1949) , and State v^ Mason, 
94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920 (1938). 
As with the analysis detailed in the foregoing Point If 
persons between the ages of 18 and 21 employed in private clubsf 
restaurants with liquor licenses, and special one event permits 
are excluded from the operation of Salt Lake City Ordinances 19-
3-8 and 19-3-9 yet are not logically dif ferentiable from those 
persons within the purvieu of the Ordinances in question. Any 
differences which can be drawn are counter to the declared 
policies of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, and the 
ordinances are consequently rendered arbitrary and 
unconstitutional. These statutory classifications are not based 
upon differences that have a reasonable relation to the policy 
objectives of Title 32A, Liedtke v. Schettler, 649 P.2d 80 (Utah 
1982), but rather show an unreasonable or fanciful relationship. 
Slater v^ Salt Lake City, 115 Utah.2.d at 494, 206 P.2d 153. 
Such discrimination is unreasonable and should be held 
unconstitutional. 
POINT III 
LN THE ALTERNATIVE, SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCES 19-3-8 AND 19-3-9 
SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO EXCEPT PERSONS NOT INVOLVED LN 
THE SALE OR DISTRIBUTION OF ALCOHOL 
Salt Lake City Ordinances 19-3-8 and 19-3-9 provide an 
important function in prohibiting persons between the ages of 18 
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and 21 from purchasing, selling or distributing beer in retail 
beer outlets. These Ordinances provide an important function 
and are well within the police power of the city, so long as they 
are judicially construed to limit their application to patrons of 
the establishment and the handling, selling or dispensing of 
alcoholic beverages by employees. Such a construction clearly 
does not serve an injustice to the Ordinances and is consistent 
with the long recognized importance of the right to work and the 
concomitant opportunity to achieve economic security and 
stability as an essential element of constitutionally protected 
rights of life, liberty and happiness. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 
33, 60 L.Ed.2d 31 (1915). 
CONCLUSION 
Under both federal and state equal protection analysis, 
Salt Lake City Ordinances 19-3-8 and 19-3-9 deprive Appellants of 
their equal protection guarantees and should be found 
unconstitutional. In the alternative, the subject Ordinances 
should be construed so as to permit the employment of persons 
between the ages of 18 and 21 in retail beer outlets so long as 
they are not involved in the sale or distribution of alcoholic 
substances. Based upon these conclusions, the judgment entered 
against Defendants should be reversed and the sentence as applied 
withdrawn. 
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